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Abstract [NEEDS REVISING] 
Many common words have spatial associations (e.g., “bird,” “jump”) that, counterintuitively, 
hinder identification of visual targets at their associated location. For example, “bird” hinders 
identification at the top of a display. This spatial interference has been attributed to 
perceptual simulation: “bird” shifts attention upward and evokes the perceptual representation 
of a bird, which impairs target identification by preoccupying the visual system. We propose 
an alternative explanation based on perceptual matching: target objects and locations are 
coded independently for their congruence with the cue word, and codes that are inconsistent 
with one another hinder identification. “Bird” hinders identification of a square target in the 
upper visual field because the target object mismatches the cue but its location matches the 
cue, thereby creating inconsistent codes that slow responding. We tested these competing 
accounts by comparing spatial interference from strongly visual (e.g., “bird”) and nonvisual 
(e.g., “arise”) cue words. Across two experiments with a large sample of nouns (Experiment 
1) and verbs (Experiment 2), words of strong and weak visual strength and imageability 
elicited equivalent spatial interference. Thus, spatial interference is attributable to perceptual 
matching rather than perceptual simulation. Moreover, results supported a graded model of 
perceptual matching, whereby target identification times are proportional to the physical 
distance between the expected (i.e., associated) and observed (i.e., actual) target locations.  
 
Keywords: abstract and concrete concepts; imageability; linguistic orienting; perceptual 
matching; perceptual simulation; visual strength; visuo-spatial attention. 
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Introduction 
Many common words have spatial associations. For instance, the words “bird” and 
“jump” have upward associations, whereas “snake” and “crawl” have downward associations 
(Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). Moreover, words that have spatial 
associations guide visual attention toward the associated location and thus influence 
perception. “Bird” and “jump” direct attention upward, whereas “snake” and “crawl” direct 
attention downward (e.g., Dudschig et al., 2013; Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008; Gozli, 
Chasteen, & Pratt, 2013; Quadflieg et al., 2011). However, the effect of such linguistic 
orienting on visual perception may be counter-intuitive: Language often interferes with visual 
perception at an associated location. For instance, “bird” elicits slower identification of a 
visual target presented at the top of a display than to that same visual target presented at the 
bottom of the display. We refer to this as the spatial interference effect. Although this effect 
has been demonstrated many times, its theoretical explanation remains relatively unexplored. 
The present study thus aims to test two contrasting explanations of the spatial interference 
effect. First we briefly review the evidence for this effect. 
The Spatial Interference Effect 
Language may interfere with visual perception at an implied location. In the initial 
demonstration of this effect, Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, and McRae (2003) presented 
sentences with verbs that had either a vertical association (e.g., “The eagle flies to the river”) 
or a horizontal association (e.g., “The miner pushes the cart”), and then they presented a 
visual target (i.e., ● or ■) at the top, bottom, left, or right of a display. Participants simply 
identified the target as a square or a circle. Vertically associated sentences interfered with 
target detection on the vertical axis. For instance, after hearing “The eagle flies to the river”, 
targets were detected significantly more slowly at the top and bottom locations than at the left 
and right locations. Richardson et al. thus revealed a spatial interference effect, however they 
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did not report separate analyses of upward and downward stimuli. Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, 
and Narayanan (2007) presented sentences with upward (e.g., “The mule climbed”) or 
downward (e.g., “The chair toppled”) motion verbs, followed by a square or circle at the top 
or bottom of a display. Upward and downward verbs respectively elicited slower target 
identification at the top and bottom of the display, thereby demonstrating an interference 
effect that was specific to the location associated with the verb. This location-specific spatial 
interference was replicated in a second study using upward (e.g., “The ceiling cracked”) and 
downward association nouns (e.g., “The cellar flooded”). Estes et al. (2008) obtained the 
same effect with single word cues. They presented words denoting objects that typically 
occur upward (e.g., “hat”) or downward (e.g., “boot”) in the visual field, followed by a visual 
target (i.e., X or O) at the top or bottom of a display. Target identification was significantly 
slower in the denoted object’s typical location. For example, “hat” and “boot” elicited slower 
responses at top and bottom locations, respectively. Verges and Duffy (2009) further 
replicated this spatial interference effect with both nouns and verbs. Thus, spatial 
interference1 has been demonstrated many times by several research groups (see also Gozli et 
al., 2013).  
Strikingly, the spatial interference effect occurs despite the utter irrelevance of the 
spatial cue for judgment of the target object. To begin with, participants could successfully 
complete the task of identifying the target object (e.g., ● or ■) without even reading the 
spatial cues. And indeed, in this paradigm, the cue word (e.g., “bird”) never matches the 
target object (e.g., ●) on a single trial of the experiment. So why does the cue word have any 
                                                 
1 This spatial interference effect differs both methodologically and theoretically from the spatial iconicity effect, whereby 
words elicit faster responses when presented or responded to in their associated (iconic) location. That is, upward association 
words (e.g., “eagle”) elicit faster responses when presented at the top of a display or when responding entails upward 
movement or pressing a high button, whereas downward association words (e.g., “snake”) elicit faster responses when 
presented at the bottom of a display or when responding entails downward movement or pressing a low button (Kaup et al., 
2012; Lachmair et al., 2011; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press; Meier et al., 2007; Schubert, 2005; Šetić & 
Domijan, 2007; Thornton, Loetscher, Yates, & Nicholls, 2013; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). Methodologically, the iconicity 
effect differs from the interference effect in that iconicity entails responding to the word itself rather than a separate visual 
target. Theoretically, spatial interference thus can be used to test predictions about spatial cueing and visual perception, 
whereas spatial iconicity cannot. The present research investigates only the spatial interference effect. 
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effect at all on target identification? Presumably, the cue words are effective because in many 
circumstances such linguistic orienting facilitates perception and action (e.g., Barsalou, 2009; 
Hommel, 2004; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976): Words guide visual attention toward objects 
that might be the referent, thereby facilitating perception of the denoted object among an 
array of distracters (Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Spivey, Tyler, 
Eberhard, & Tanenhaus, 2001). For instance, “snake” guides attention to curved objects 
(Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005). The spatial interference effect presumably also arises from this 
linguistically mediated visual search. But whereas those prior studies revealed an object-
based search (Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Spivey et al., 2001), in 
which the cue word (e.g., “snake”) induces a search for the referent’s associated features (i.e., 
curved), the spatial interference effect instead reveals a location-based search, in which the 
cue induces a search in the referent’s associated location (i.e., downward). If snakes are seen 
most often in the lower visual field, and if “snake” shifts one’s attention downward, then 
“snake” would guide one’s visual search toward the referent’s most likely location. The cue 
word thus induces a search for its referent, even though the target object never matches the 
cue word in this paradigm, and even though the task could be completed successfully without 
reading the cue word. The spatial interference effect thus appears to be quite compelling.  
Location-Specific Perceptual Representation 
Words denoting objects (e.g., “sun”) and events (e.g., “rise”) activate spatial 
representations that direct attention to their associated location (e.g., up). But why should 
they interfere with rather than facilitate perception at that associated location? Why does 
“sun” temporarily blind the perceptual system at the top of a display? In addition to activating 
spatial associations, words have long been known to activate perceptual representations (e.g., 
Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976), which in more recent terminology is often called “perceptual 
simulation” (for review see Barsalou, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). For example, the word 
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“lemon” activates the appearance, taste, smell, and feel of previously experienced lemons. 
Many studies have shown that hearing a word activates the cortical networks involved in the 
actual perception or execution of the denoted object or action (Martin, 2007; Pulvermuller & 
Fadiga, 2010), and many others have demonstrated that words affect perception and action 
(Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Such perceptual 
representations can be intentionally generated and consciously perceived, as with mental 
imagery, but perceptual representations activated during ordinary language processing appear 
to occur without conscious awareness (Pecher, van Dantzig, & Schifferstein, 2009).  
Thus the standard explanation of the spatial interference effect is that words evoke 
location-specific perceptual representations, which entail both (1) attentional orienting and 
(2) activation of perceptual representations. To illustrate, the word “bird” evokes (1) a high 
spatial association that shifts attention upward, and (2) a visual representation of a bird in that 
location. Critically, because this visual representation of a bird is incompatible with the visual 
target (e.g., ■), the representation effectively masks target identification at the associated 
location (Estes et al., 2008; Verges & Duffy, 2009). A similar explanation supposes that the 
perceptual representation engages the neural systems necessary for judging the visual target, 
thus creating interference in the form of neural competition (Bergen et al., 2007; Richardson 
et al., 2003). Although they assume different levels of explanation – i.e., perceptual masking 
or neural competition – both of these descriptions attribute the spatial interference effect to 
the activation of visuospatial representations that compete with the visual target for 
perceptual processing. We thus refer to this as the competition account of spatial interference.  
The first assumption – attentional orienting – is empirically supported. When people 
attempt to remember a recently viewed object that is no longer present, they nevertheless tend 
to redirect their eyes toward and fixate on the location at which they previously viewed the 
object (Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001). More generally, object words 
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facilitate eye movements toward the denoted object’s typical location (Dudschig et al., 2013). 
For instance, “bird” and “snake” respectively facilitate upward and downward eye 
movements. In fact, the distinct patterns of neural activation involved in judgments of “bird” 
and “snake” closely resemble actual perceptions in the upper and lower visual fields, 
respectively (Quadflieg et al., 2011; see also Zhang et al., 2013). Although such attentional 
orienting is well documented, notice that it should facilitate perception at the implied 
location, not hinder it (Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001).  
The counterintuitive direction of the effect (i.e., interference) is instead thought to 
arise from the activation of perceptual representations, which are hypothesized to visually 
mask or neurally compete with the visual target. The general claim that language evokes 
perceptual representations is supported by an overwhelming body of evidence (for reviews 
see Barsalou, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Martin, 2007; Pecher & 
Zwaan, 2005; Pulvermuller & Fadiga, 2010). However, the specific claim that perceptual 
representations cause the spatial interference effect has received little empirical investigation.  
Perceptual Matching 
We propose an alternative explanation of the spatial interference effect, based on a 
process of perceptual matching. This matching account makes two critical assumptions. First, 
supported by the prior evidence of linguistically mediated visual search (Altmann & Kamide, 
2007; Spivey et al., 2001), the matching account assumes that when a cue word is followed 
by a to-be-identified visual target, people attempt to determine whether the visual target is 
related to the cue word. Although the cue word is irrelevant to target identification in this 
paradigm, people tend to search the visual world for the referent of a verbal cue even when it 
is absent (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001). In 
fact, we assume that this search for a cue’s referent is overgeneralized, occurring even in 
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tasks where the cue’s referent is never present.2 The second critical assumption is that, in 
their attempt to determine whether the target is related to the cue, people judge the target’s 
congruence with both (1) the cued object and (2) its associated location. For instance, a 
“bird” cue induces one to check whether the perceptual target (1) appears at a bird-associated 
location and (2) is related to the concept of a bird. Thus the target object and its location are 
both, independently, coded for their congruence with the cue word. Each object or location 
code indicates whether the visual target matches or mismatches the cue, which for simplicity 
we specify here with + and – respectively. For example, “bird” followed by an unrelated 
target (e.g., “X”) at the top of the display is coded as O- L+, because a mismatching object 
(O-) appears at a matching location (L+). We further refer to two object and location codes as 
consistent when they both match or both mismatch the cue word (i.e., O+ L+ and O- L-) and 
as inconsistent when one code matches but the other code mismatches the cue (i.e., O+ L- 
and O- L+). 
Our critical claim is that inconsistent codes predict slower target identification, 
because they represent a perceptual ambiguity about the target’s identity. Specifically, 
inconsistent object and location codes indicate conflicting evidence about whether the target 
object is the cue’s referent. In the spatial interference paradigm, the target object always 
mismatches the cue word (O-). Consequently, when the target appears in the matching 
location (O- L+), this provides ambiguous evidence of whether the cue’s referent is present or 
not. The participant thus seeks to disambiguate whether the target is related to the cue word, 
and only after the cue’s referent is determined to be absent does the participant then proceed 
to identify the target object. Thus, the perceptual ambiguity introduced by inconsistent codes 
                                                 
2 Indeed, such an overgeneralization may be adaptive. Suppose someone says “snake” to you. If there is a snake 
nearby, then you will perceive it faster and respond to it sooner if the word had evoked a visual search than if it 
had not. If there is not a snake nearby, then you will lose a bit of time searching for a snake that is not there. The 
behavioral benefit of quickly perceiving a present target presumably outweighs the behavioral cost of time spent 
searching for an absent target.  
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(O- L+) causes a brief delay before the actual target is identified. In contrast, when that same 
target appears in the mismatching location (O- L-), both codes indicate that the target is not 
the cue’s referent, and hence the participant immediately proceeds to determine what the 
target object is after all.3  
To illustrate, suppose the cue word “bird” precedes a square target at the top of a 
display (cf. Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 
2009). Because the target is in the associated location, it is coded as a location match (L+). 
But because it is an unrelated object, it is coded as an object mismatch (O-). These 
inconsistent codes (O- L+) evoke further perceptual processing to determine whether the 
visual target is a bird-related object, and this delays responding. Now suppose “bird” 
precedes a square target at the bottom of the display. Although the object and location of the 
visual target both mismatch the cue word, crucially, those consistent O- and L- codes both 
indicate that the target is unrelated to the cue. And because no further processing is required 
to determine whether the target is bird-related, the task response proceeds without further 
delay. So counter-intuitively, given a visual target that is unrelated to the cue word (as in all 
prior demonstrations of the spatial interference effect), responding would be faster to targets 
that are not in the associated location than to targets that are in the associated location.  
This matching account explains spatial interference not only from nouns such as 
“bird”, but also from verbs such as “jump” (Bergen et al., 2007; Richardson et al., 2003; 
Verges & Duffy, 2009). Given that many events (and the verbs that denote them) have visuo-
                                                 
3 This hypothesized coding of objects and locations as matches (+) or mismatches (-) is reminiscent of the 
polarity correspondence principle, which states that stimulus and response dimensions are coded as +polarity or 
–polarity, and that responding is faster when those stimulus and response polarities correspond (see Proctor & 
Cho, 2006). For instance, positive words are +polar, and up is also +polar, so positive words elicit faster 
responses when presented at the top of a display (Lakens, 2012; Lynott & Coventry, 2014). Upon closer 
scrutiny, however, polarity correspondence cannot explain the spatial interference effect. Upward cues and top 
targets are both +polarity, so polarity correspondence predicts fast responding. In contrast, upward cues 
(+polarity) do not correspond with bottom targets (-polarity), so polarity correspondence predicts slow 
responding. Notice that these predictions are of spatial facilitation. Polarity correspondence thus cannot explain 
the spatial interference effect (see also Santiago & Lakens, 2015). 
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spatial representations (e.g., Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009; for review see Hommel, 2004; 
Zacks et al., 2007), the matching account explains interference from verbs in the same way 
that it explains interference from nouns: A square target at the top of the display does not 
visually represent jumping any more than it represents a bird. Thus regardless of whether the 
cue is “bird” or “jump”, a top visual target is an unrelated object in the associated location, 
thereby evoking inconsistent codes (O- L+) that induce further processing and hence delay 
responding. 
Both general tenets of this account – that objects and locations are coded 
independently, and that inconsistent codes hinder responding – have received much empirical 
support in other related domains. Indeed, a wealth of evidence indicates that objects and 
locations are processed respectively in the ventral and dorsal pathways of the visual object 
recognition system in the human brain (for review see Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994), and 
many other studies have demonstrated that conflicting spatial codes between stimulus and 
response tend to hinder responding (for review see Lu & Proctor, 1995). This does not imply, 
of course, any support for the more specific claim that inconsistent object and location codes 
cause the spatial interference effect. The following experiments tested this account. 
The Present Study 
In sum, the competition account attributes spatial interference to visual 
representations (i.e., the cue visually or neurally masks the target), whereas the matching 
account attributes spatial interference to spatial associations (i.e., the object and location 
codes are inconsistent). There is much evidence that words evoke both spatial associations 
and visual representations, but no prior study has tested which of these explains the spatial 
interference effect. We therefore conducted four experiments that tested these accounts. 
Experiments 1 and 2 tested a fundamental assumption of both models: Although visual 
targets that are semantically unrelated to the cue word elicit spatial interference (as described 
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above), semantically related visual targets should elicit facilitation instead. That is, “bird” 
should facilitate perception of a bird at the top of a display. Surprisingly, this basic 
assumption of both accounts has not previously been tested. After obtaining evidence of both 
spatial interference and facilitation in Experiments 1 and 2, then Experiments 3 and 4 
critically discriminated between these accounts, which make differential predictions 
concerning effects of abstract cue words such as “love” and “lapse”. Simply stated, if spatial 
interference were caused by visual representations (i.e., the competition account), then 
abstract cue words should elicit less interference than concrete cue words. In contrast, if 
spatial interference were due to spatial associations (i.e., the matching account), then any cue 
word with spatial associations could elicit strong interference. These predictions are 
developed more fully after Experiments 1 and 2.  
Experiment 1 
All prior demonstrations of the spatial interference effect used semantically unrelated 
visual targets such as “X” and “O” or ■ and ●. Somewhat surprisingly, the more naturalistic 
case in which a cue word is followed by a semantically related visual target has yet to be 
tested. Thus, in the present experiment we presented spatially associated cue words (e.g., 
“bird”) followed by a visual target that was either semantically related (i.e., an image of a 
bird) or semantically unrelated to the cue (e.g., an image of a wrench) and that appeared in 
either the associated location (i.e., top) or the opposite location (i.e., bottom). We also 
included some trials in which the visual target was not a real object (i.e., 
arbitrarypseudorandom [JSA1]shapes[JSA2] and lines), and participants’ task was to indicate 
whether the target was a real object.  
This experiment provides a critical test of the competition and matching accounts, but it 
does not discriminate between them. As described above, both accounts explain the 
interference effect with semantically unrelated targets (e.g., “bird” followed by an image of a 
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wrench). In contrast, both accounts predict a facilitation effect with semantically related 
targets (e.g., “bird” followed by an image of a bird). By the competition account, the cue 
word elicits a perceptual representation of the cue in its associated location. When the pre-
activated visual target then appears in that location, perception is facilitated. By the matching 
account, when the object and location codes both indicate a cue-target match (O+ L+), the 
target is identified as the cue’s referent. But when that related target appears in an 
unassociated location (O+ L-), those inconsistent codes briefly delay recognition of the cue’s 
referent as the target object. Thus, both accounts predict an interaction, with interference 
from semantically unrelated targets in the associated location but facilitation from related 
targets in the associated location. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-one undergraduates at the University of Warwick participated for course 
Stimuli 
Cues were twenty concrete nouns with spatial associations (10 upward, 10 downward) 
sampled from prior studies on language and spatial attention (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 
2008; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009). Upward cues were “bird”, “cloud”, 
“flag”, “forest”, “galaxy”, “hat”, “palace”, “plane”, “satellite”, and “star”; downward cues 
were “arrow”, “bottle”, “bowl”, “coin”, “fork”, “insect”, “lobster”, “shoes”, “slippers”, and 
“snake”. Targets were black-and-white line drawings. Twenty “semantically related” targets 
depicted the cue words, and 20 “semantically unrelated” targets depicted real objects that 
were unrelated to the cue words (e.g., ticket). Note that if the unrelated targets also had 
upward or downward associations, those target associations could interact with the spatial 
associations of the cues. So given that our primary interest was spatial effects of the cues, we 
used semantically unrelated targets that had neutral spatial associations. All but four of these 
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40 cues and targets were included in a norming study by Verges and Duffy (2009), who had 
participants rate the extent to which each word referred to an object typically associated with 
upward or downward locations (1 = downward, 7 = upward). The downward (Range = 2.50 
to 3.14) and upward cues (Range = 4.45 to 6.64) had non-overlapping ranges of spatial 
associations. The semantically unrelated targets were clustered around the neutral midpoint of 
the scale and did not overlap with the upward and downward cues (Range = 3.18 to 4.14). An 
additional twenty targets consisted of novel shapes and lines that did not depict a 
recognizable object; these targets served as the non-objects.  
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in individual sessions within a sound-attenuated room, 
with participants seated at a standard desktop computer. Full instructions are provided in the 
online Supplementary Materials, and the trial procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. Participants 
initiated each trial by pressing the space bar, which evoked a blank inter-stimulus interval 
(250 ms), followed by a central fixation (250 ms), a central cue word (100 ms), and another 
blank inter-stimulus interval (50 ms). Finally, a target appeared at either the top or bottom of 
the display and remained onscreen until the participant indicated via key press whether it was 
a real object (M key) or not (X key).4 Incorrect responses elicited an error message 
(“WRONG!”) before proceeding to the next trial. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 1 s. Each 
cue (e.g., “bird”) appeared with three targets: semantically related (i.e., image of a bird), 
semantically unrelated (i.e., image of a wrench), and non-object (i.e., a nonsense image). 
Moreover, each cue appeared with each of those three objects twice: once at the top and once 
at the bottom of the display. In total then, each cue appeared six times, such that semantically 
related and unrelated objects and non-objects were equiprobable at top and bottom locations. 
                                                 
4 Following prior studies (e.g., Estes et al., 2008), we used a short 150 ms delay between cue and target onsets in 
order to exclude potential explanations based on inhibition of return, which is thought to emerge approximately 
200-300 ms after cue onset (see Klein, 2000). 
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Thus there were 120 trials per participant (i.e., 20 cues × 3 targets × 2 locations), randomized 
individually within-participants. Participants completed twelve practice trials prior to the 
experimental trials.  
Results 
Analyses and Reporting. For each experiment reported in this paper, data were 
analysed via mixed effects regression modelling with participants and items as crossed 
random effects5. Results are reported in terms of the unstandardized regression coefficient, B. 
For each experiment, all significant effects (p < .05) are described in the text, and any effect 
not described in the text was not significant. However, full results (including nonsignificant 
effects) are available online as Supplementary Materials.  
Outliers. Outlying response times more than 2.5 SDs from the mean, calculated 
separately for each participant and each condition, were removed from analyses (2.50% of 
trials). Response times from trials that elicited an error were also excluded from analyses 
(3.68% of trials). Additionally, one outlying participant whose overall mean error rate was 
more than 2.5 SDs beyond the group mean was excluded from all analyses (2.44% of 
participants). The analyses reported below thus were calculated across 40 participants.  
                                                 
5 Our strategy with respect to the random terms was to aim to use maximal structure: that is, include random 
slopes with respect to subjects for within-subject manipulations and random slopes with respect to cue words for 
within-item manipulations (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).  All categorical variables were binary and 
were coded using centered variables so that the presence of interactions did not break the interpretation of main 
effects.  We used models that did not estimate the correlations of the random effects, as these terms have 
negligible influence on results (Barr et al., Appendix) and hinder convergence.  In several cases, particularly 
those involving error rates, it was not possible to use the desired structure due to failure to converge.  We sought 
to drop random slopes to achieve convergence in those cases, and report these results; in no case was there a 
difference in conclusion between treating the unconverged estimates as accurate or using the model with random 
slopes dropped.  In some more serious cases involving error rates, the only solution was to fit two models, one 
with subjects random and one with items random; these yielded consistent results with one another, and, in any 
case, our conclusions are based on the patterns in RTs not those in errors.  Where one of these fallback strategies 
was used, the relevant results are footnoted accordingly. 
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Error Rates. Errors were rare and random. A logistic mixed effects regressionsn6 
found no significant effects or interactions of spatial association (upward, downward), target 
object (semantically related, unrelated), or target location (top, bottom), all p > .10.  
Response Times. Response times were analyzed via linear mixed effects regression 
with participants and items as crossed random effects, with spatial association, target object, 
target location, and all possible interactions as categorical predictors. The effect of target 
object was significant, B = -46.96, t = 3.22, p = .001, with faster responses to semantically 
related targets than to unrelated targets. That is, responding was faster when the cue’s referent 
was present than it was absent. This effect is unsurprising, as target-present trials are typically 
faster than target-absent trials in other visual search tasks. More importantly, the predicted 3-
way interaction was also significant, B = -53.43, t = 2.56, p = .01. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
the semantically unrelated targets exhibited a spatial interference effect. Follow-up analyses 
examining only the semantically unrelated targets confirmed that this spatial interference 
effect was indeed significant, evident here as a spatial association × target location 
interaction, B = 34.52, t = 1.98, p < .05. The semantically related targets, in contrast, 
exhibited a nonsignificant trend (p = .19) toward spatial facilitation (see Figure 2). 
Specifically, the related object targets following an upward cue (i.e., the two light bars at the 
right of Figure 2) exhibit spatial facilitation, but the downward cues elicited no effect. 
Follow-up analyses examining only the semantically related targets revealed only a 
significant effect of target location, B = -17.97, t = 2.51, p = .01, with faster responses at the 
top location than at the bottom. 
Discussion. The predicted 3-way interaction was obtained, but whereas the spatial 
interference effect with semantically unrelated targets was significant, the spatial facilitation 
                                                 
6 By-subject and by-items regressions had to be run separately.  No random slopes could be fitted in either 
model without removing the random intercept.  In all cases, no effect approached significance because accuracy 
was practically at ceiling. 
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effect with semantically related targets did not reach significance. As in prior studies (Bergen 
et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Gozli et al., 2013; Verges & Duffy, 2009), cue words elicited 
slower responses (17 ms slower) to semantically unrelated targets appearing at the associated 
location than at an unassociated location. For example, “bird” elicited slower recognition of a 
wrench at the top of the display than at the bottom. In contrast, cue words elicited faster 
responses (10 ms faster) to semantically related targets appearing at the associated location 
than at an unassociated location. For instance, “bird” elicited faster recognition of a bird at 
the top of the display than at the bottom. However, the lack of a significant facilitation effect 
with related targets obscured our theoretical conclusions.  
Experiment 2 
In attempt to clarify our theoretical conclusions, Experiment 2 provided a more 
powerful test of the predicted spatial facilitation effect with semantically related targets. We 
increased statistical power by substantially increasing both the number of participants (from 
41 in Experiment 1 to 100 in Experiment 2) and the number of items (from 20 in Experiment 
1 to 60 in Experiment 2). In order to keep the experiment short enough to maintain 
participants’ attention, we used only semantically related targets in Experiment 2. Thus the 
design was a 2 (spatial association: upward, downward) × 2 (target location: top, bottom) 
within-participants, and the method was the object decision task used in Experiment 1. The 
competition account and the matching account both predict spatial facilitation (for 
explanation see Experiment 1), which would be evident here as an interaction. The 
experiment was conducted online, with participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, and with stimuli presented and response times recorded with millisecond accuracy via 
JavaScript. The use of Mechanical Turk for participant recruitment in behavioral research has 
been extensively validated (for review see Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), as have the accuracy 
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and reliability of response times collected online via JavaScript (Reimers & Stewart, in 
press). 
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred US-based respondents on Mechanical Turk were paid $2.00 for 
participation. An additional 100 respondents were paid $0.50 for participating in a spatial 
rating pre-test.  
Spatial Rating Pre-Test 
From prior studies of language and spatial attention (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 
2008; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009) we selected nouns denoting common 
objects. We then supplemented this initial list with additional object nouns that, by our 
intuitions, fully spanned the range of spatial associations. The final list consisted of 180 
concrete nouns, which were presented in individually randomized order to 100 participants. 
For each item participants indicated where on the vertical axis they would expect to see the 
object, on a scale from 1 (“extremely low”) to 5 (“extremely high”). However, participants 
could alternatively indicate that they would expect to see the object “nowhere in particular”; 
this option was intended to exclude spatially indeterminate words from the experiment. Full 
instructions are provided in the online Supplementary Materials, and full results are reported 
in Appendix A.   
Stimuli 
Sixty cue words were selected from the Spatial Rating Pre-Test. First, any word that 
received 20% or more of the spatially indeterminate “nowhere” responses was excluded. We 
then selected the 30 words with the lowest mean ratings and the 30 words with the highest 
mean ratings, with the constraint that we were also able to obtain a suitable line drawing of 
the denoted object (to be used as visual targets). The downward (Range = 1.13 to 1.67) and 
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upward cues (Range = 3.64 to 4.94) had non-overlapping ranges of spatial associations. 
Object targets were 60 black-and-white line drawings of the objects denoted by the cue 
words. Non-object targets were the same 20 nonsense images of pseudorandom shapes and 
lines used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except that it was modified for web-based 
data collection. Instructions are provided online as Supplementary Materials. We strongly 
discouraged inattentive participants by clearly informing them of the demanding nature of the 
task. Moreover, only users with a successful task completion rate of greater than 99% and 
with at least 100 tasks completed were eligible to participate. Upon accepting the task in 
Mechanical Turk, respondents were re-directed to an external website that hosted the 
experiment, which was presented as an HTML webpage with JavaScript code running locally 
in each participant’s browser. The procedure required use of a separate hardware keyboard 
and a minimum screen resolution, thereby excluding users on most mobile devices (e.g., 
tablets and phones).  
The trial procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that the ITI was reduced to 
500 ms in order to reduce the duration of the experiment. Each of the 60 cues appeared four 
times: object target at the top, object target at the bottom, non-object target at the top, and 
non-object target at the bottom. Thus there were 240 trials in total, randomized individually 
within-participants. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants received a password 
consisting of a string of digits generated randomly for each participant. They then returned to 
the Mechanical Turk website, where they copied this password into a textbox in order to 
validate their participation and receive payment. They also were asked if there was anything 
that they wanted to tell us about the task, and a textbox was provided for their responses. 
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Although we pre-determined our sample size to be 100 participants, we ran the 
experiment across two days, with 50 participants per day. Because our use of web-based 
methods for response time measurement was relatively novel to the field and absolutely novel 
to us, we chose to trial it on 50 participants, from whom we could (a) examine the reliability 
of their datasets and (b) receive their feedback. Our initial check indicated that the data 
appeared to be reliable, but several of the participants commented that the task was extremely 
long and tedious, and they suggested that we provide some indication of participants’ 
progress across the task. Thus, for the second day of the experiment we amended the 
initiation of each trial so that it now indicated their progress (e.g., “Press space bar when 
ready (X/240)”, where X = trial number). The procedure was otherwise identical to the first 
day of the experiment. 
Results 
Outliers. Outlying response times more than 2.5 SDs from the mean, calculated 
separately for each participant and each condition, were removed from analyses (3.06% of 
trials). Response times from trials that elicited an error were also excluded from analyses 
(2.61% of trials). Additionally, one outlying participant whose overall mean error rate was 
more than 2.5 SDs beyond the group mean was excluded from all analyses (1.00% of 
participants). The analyses reported below thus were calculated across 99 participants.  
Error Rates. Error rates were analyzed via logistic mixed effects regression with 
participants and items as crossed random effects, with spatial association, target location, and 
their interaction as categorical predictors.7 Only the effect of target location was significant, 
B = -.26, t = 2.09, p < .05, with more accurate responses when targets appeared at the bottom 
(M = 2.94%) than at the top of the display (M = 2.29%).  
                                                 
7 Models with the subject random-slope for the spatial association factor and the interaction did not converge,, 
so the random slope was only fitted for target location. but those unconverged solutions yielded the same pattern 
of significant results.This choice did not alter the conclusions. 
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Response Times. Response times were analyzed via linear mixed effects regression 
with participants and items as crossed random effects, with spatial association, target 
location, and their interaction as categorical predictors. A significant effect of target location 
confirmed that responses were faster when targets appeared at the top (M = 612 ms) than at 
the bottom of the display (M = 638 ms), B = -25.96, t = 6.13, p < .001. Thus, top targets 
elicited faster but less accurate responses that bottom targets. More importantly, the spatial 
association × target location interaction was also significant, B = -15.26, t = 2.36, p = .02. As 
shown in Figure 3, top targets elicited faster responses after upward cues than downward 
cues, whereas bottom targets elicited faster responses after downward cues than upward cues. 
This spatial facilitation effect was small (7 ms) but significant. 
Discussion. Experiment 2 revealed significant spatial facilitation with semantically 
related targets. That is, “bird” elicited faster recognition of a bird at the top of a display than 
at the bottom. This experiment not only demonstrates spatial facilitation in a visual 
discrimination task, it also provides one of the first demonstrations of the reliability of web-
based response time measurements in an attentional task of this sort (see also Crump, 
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). This spatial facilitation of semantically related targets 
supports a critical assumption of both the competition and the matching accounts. Next we 
attempted to discriminate between these two accounts.  
Differentiating the Accounts 
The competition account and the matching account make differing predictions 
concerning spatial interference from cue words varying in imageability—that is, the ease with 
which a word evokes a perceptual representation. For generality, in addition to imageability, 
we also consider abstract and concrete concepts. Imageability is strongly correlated with 
concreteness (Clark & Paivio, 2004; Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982; Paivio, 
Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Reilly & Kean, 2007) and hence the two measures are often 
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considered synonymous (Reilly & Kean, 2007; for review see Connell & Lynott, 2012; for a 
contrary view see Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del Campo, 2011). 
If spatial interference is due to perceptual competition (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et 
al., 2008; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009), then highly imageable words 
should elicit more interference than low imageability words, because highly imageable words 
by definition are more strongly perceptual than low imageability words (Wiemer-Hastings & 
Xu, 2005). It must be noted, however, that this prediction may not emerge from all models of 
abstract concept representation. There is broad consensus that concrete, highly imageable 
concepts are represented primarily in terms of their sensorimotor features (e.g., Barsalou, 
2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Kousta et al., 2011). Regarding the representation of abstract 
concepts, however, there currently is no consensus. The majority of researchers have 
proposed that abstract concepts are represented primarily in terms of the introspective and/or 
affective information acquired during prior experiences or situations of those abstract 
concepts (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Kousta et al., 2011; Pecher, Boot, & van 
Dantzig, 2011). By these models, abstract concepts are less perceptual than concrete 
concepts, and hence abstract concepts should elicit less spatial interference than concrete 
concepts. However, a more extreme model argues that abstract concepts are represented via 
conceptual metaphors (e.g., “love is a journey”) that map the abstract concept (i.e., love) onto 
a sensorimotor source concept (i.e., journey; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; for review and critical evaluation see Pecher et al., 2011). Thus, by this conceptual 
metaphor theory, abstract concepts might alternatively be expected to elicit the same amount 
of spatial interference as concrete concepts. In general though, if spatial interference is due to 
perceptual competition from visual representations (i.e., the competition account), then highly 
imageable words should elicit more interference than low imageability words. 
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In contrast, the matching account predicts that abstract, non-imageable cue words 
should elicit the same amount of interference as concrete, highly imageable words. This is 
because the target object and its location are both coded for their congruence with the cue 
word, even if that cue word’s meaning and its spatial association are purely metaphorical. For 
example, liberal and conservative politicians respectively shift attention leftward and 
rightward (Mills, Smith, Hibbin, & Dodd, 2015), and past tense and future tense also 
respectively shift attention leftward and rightward (Ouellet, Santiago, Funez, & Lupianez, 
2010). Thus, it is not necessary for the word to have a referent that actually physically occurs 
in the given location in order to elicit spatial effects. So long as the cue word has a spatial 
association, the to-be-identified visual target will be coded for its congruence with that cue. 
Consequently, even purely abstract words that lack a visual referent can induce spatial 
effects.  Suppose “love”, which has an upward spatial association, is followed by a square 
target at the top of the display. That visual target is unrelated to the cue word, so the codes 
are inconsistent (O- L+) and thus interference ensues. If that target instead appears at the 
bottom of the display, then the codes are consistent (O- L-) and hence responding should be 
faster. So unlike the competition account, the matching account predicts equivalent 
interference from cue words of high and low imageability.  
Do Abstract Concepts Elicit Spatial Interference? 
Prior evidence concerning whether imageability (or concreteness) moderates the 
spatial interference effect is sparse and inconclusive. In their original demonstration of the 
spatial interference effect, Richardson et al. (2003) included both abstract and concrete 
sentences as spatial cues. Surprisingly, they found significant spatial interference from 
abstract sentences but not from concrete sentences (see their footnote 1). As pointed out by 
Bergen et al. (2007), however, Richardson et al.’s abstract sentences consisted of an abstract 
verb instantiated with concrete subject and object nouns (e.g., “The girl hopes for a pony”), 
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thus likely rendering the sentences concrete rather than abstract. Bergen et al. therefore 
examined spatial interference from sentences that were more clearly concrete (e.g., “The 
mule climbed”) or abstract (e.g., “The cost climbed”). In direct contrast to Richardson et al., 
Bergen et al. found spatial interference with concrete sentences, but no effect with abstract 
sentences. They concluded that abstract concepts do not evoke location-specific perceptual 
representations. More recently, both abstract and concrete words have been shown to elicit 
spatial interference at short delays between cue and target presentation, but instead elicit 
spatial facilitation at long delays (Goodhew, McGaw, & Kidd, 2014; Gozli et al., 2013).  
However, the theoretical clarity and explanatory power of imageability and 
concreteness have recently been challenged (Connell & Lynott, 2012; Kousta et al., 2011). 
Although imageability and concreteness ratings are supposed to take into account all five 
sensory modalities, it is unclear to what extent a single imageability or concreteness value 
reflects each of the various modalities (Connell & Lynott, 2012), and in fact neither 
imageability nor concreteness ratings adequately reflect the full range of people’s sensory 
experience of a concept (Connell & Lynott, 2012; Juhasz et al., 2011). Alternatively, several 
research groups have recently espoused the use of perceptual strength ratings collected 
separately for each modality (Amsell, Urbach, & Kutas, 2012; Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2012; 
van Dantzig, Cowell, Zeelenberg, & Pecher, 2011), and indeed a rapidly growing number of 
studies have shown that those perceptual strength ratings reliably predict a range of cognitive 
and linguistic behaviors such as word reading times, lexical decision times, property 
verification times, concreteness judgment times, and memory accuracy (Amsel et al., 2012; 
Connell & Lynott, 2010, 2011; Louwerse & Connell, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2009; van 
Dantzig et al., 2011). In a particularly striking demonstration, Connell and Lynott (2012) 
showed that when the perceptual strength of each of the five modalities are rated separately, 
those perceptual strength ratings explain significantly and substantially more variance in 
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word naming and lexical decision response times and error rates than do either imageability 
ratings or concreteness ratings, thus dramatically outperforming standard measures that were 
used in research for the prior 50 years.  
To provide a stronger and more precise test of the competition account of spatial 
interference, we therefore examined the effect of visual strength (i.e., perceptual strength in 
the visual modality; Lynott & Connell, 2009, 2012) on target detection. The competition 
account concerns the visual modality in particular, so these visual strength ratings provide a 
more direct test of the hypothesis than any prior study. If spatial interference is due to visual 
competition, then words that elicit stronger visual representations (i.e., visually strong words) 
should elicit more spatial interference than visually weak words. Alternatively, if spatial 
interference were due to spatial coding (i.e., the matching account), then visually weak words 
should also induce spatial interference if they have strong spatial associations. 
Experiments 3 and 4: Discriminating Between Accounts 
We tested via the cueing paradigm whether visually strong and weak nouns 
(Experiment 3) and verbs (Experiment 4) elicit spatial interference. Our sample of cue words 
(N = 256) was considerably larger than prior studies. Visually strong (e.g., “bird”) and 
visually weak (e.g., “love”) cue words appeared one at a time in the center of a display, 
followed by an unrelated visual target (X or O) at the top or bottom of the display, and 
participants simply identified each target as X or O by keypress (as in Estes et al., 2008). For 
brevity, Experiments 3 and 4 are reported together as a between-participant manipulation of 
word class (nouns, verbs).  
Methods 
Participants 
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Undergraduates at Rutgers University-Camden participated in Experiments 3 (N = 53) 
and 4 (N = 40) for course credit. None participated in both experiments. An additional 52 
participants from Mechanical Turk participated in a Visual Strength Pre-Test.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli were 256 cue words (see Appendixes B and C for a complete list of the 128 
noun and verb cues, respectively). Many were sampled from prior studies on language and 
spatial attention (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 
2007; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009), and others were generated to vary in 
word class (nouns, verbs), spatial association (upward, downward), and visual strength 
(weak, strong). Stimulus properties are summarized in Table 1 and detailed below.  
Spatial Association. Spatial association ratings of the nouns were obtained from 
norms by Verges and Duffy (2009), who had participants rate the extent to which each word 
referred to an object typically associated with upward or downward locations (cf. Spatial 
Rating Pre-Test of Experiment 2). Spatial association ratings of the verbs were obtained from 
Meteyard and Vigliocco (2009), who had participants judge whether each word matched 
various spatial arrangements. We calculated spatial association scores by subtracting each 
verb’s “down” score from its “up” score, so that higher scores indicated an upward 
association. Because the ratings of the nouns and verbs were collected via different methods 
and with different samples, they were Z-transformed within each class (nouns, verbs) and 
then combined. Thus, the spatial association values reported in Table 1 and Appendixes B 
and C are Z-scores, with higher values indicating upward associations and lower values 
indicating downward associations. Nouns and verbs both exhibited a large range of spatial 
associations with minimal skew, thus validating this factor for use in regression analyses. 
Visual Strength Pre-Test. Fifty-two US-based participants were recruited from 
Mechanical Turk and were paid $0.75 for participating in a norming study of visual strength. 
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Following Lynott and Connell (2012), visual strength was measured as “the extent to which 
you experience [word] by seeing” on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (greatly). Each participant 
rated all 254 words (“flower” and “tower” appeared once as a noun and once as a verb in the 
experiment proper but appeared only once in the norming study) by clicking a radio button to 
the right of each word to indicate the selected rating. Word order was randomized within 
participants. The instructions emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers and 
encouraged participants to use the entire rating scale. To ensure that participants paid careful 
attention, we also included the six number words from “zero” to “five”, and we instructed 
participants to select the response number indicated by the word (e.g., given “two”, respond 
“2”). These attention checks appeared randomly throughout the list. Thirteen participants 
who failed this attention check (i.e., at least one incorrect response) were excluded from the 
study, leaving a valid sample of 39 participants.  
As evident in Table 1, the visual strength scores exhibited good range with little skew, 
and so were appropriate for regression analyses. Thirty-eight of the words were also included 
in Lynott and Connell’s most recent set of extended norms (personal communication). Our 
visual strength ratings correlated significantly with their visual strength ratings, r = +.66, p < 
.001, thus cross-validating the present ratings. Our visual strength ratings also correlated 
significantly with the spatial association scores (r = -.28, p < .001), such that visually weaker 
(abstract) concepts tended to have upward spatial associations. However, the weakness of this 
correlation indicated no problem of collinearity between the two predictors (Field, 2009). 
This noncollinearity was further supported in the main analysis of response times reported 
below, tolerance = .91 and VIF = 1.10.   
Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to Estes et al. (2008, Experiment 3), which was also 
similar to Experiment 1 reported here. Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space 
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bar, which evoked a blank inter-stimulus interval (250 ms), followed by a central fixation 
(250 ms), a central cue word (100 ms), and another blank inter-stimulus interval (50 ms). 
Finally, a target appeared at either the top or bottom of the display and remained onscreen 
until the participant identified it as X or O via key press. Targets subtended approximately 1° 
of visual angle and appeared approximately 8° above or below the central fixation. Each cue 
appeared only once, with a randomly assigned Target Location (top, bottom) and Target 
Letter (X, O), such that each participant received equal numbers of top and bottom targets 
and X and O targets in each experimental condition. Thus there were 128 trials per 
participant. Trial order was randomized individually for each participant, and participants 
completed ten practice trials prior to the experimental trials.  
Results 
Outliers. Four items with mean response times more than 2.5 SDs beyond the overall 
mean were excluded (1.56% of items), thus leaving 252 items in total. Additionally, two 
outlying participants whose overall mean error rate was more than 2.5 SDs beyond the group 
mean were excluded from all analyses (2.15% of participants). The analyses reported below 
thus were calculated across 52 and 39 participants in Experiments 3 and 4 respectively. 
Response times from trials that elicited an error were excluded from analyses (5.62% of 
trials). Outlying response times more than 2.5 SDs from the mean, calculated separately for 
each participant and each condition, were also removed from analyses (0.79% of trials).  
Error Rates. Errors were analyzed via logistic mixed effects regressions8 with 
participants and items as crossed random effects, with word class (nouns, verbs) and target 
location (top, bottom) as categorical predictors, with spatial association and visual strength as 
continuous predictors, and with all possible interactions included. Only the main effect of 
                                                 
8 No crossed random-effects model would converge, so separate random-subjects and random-items analyses 
were performed, with matching results (also matching unconverged estimates). 
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spatial association was significant, B = -.11, t = 2.04, p < .05: As spatial associations 
increased (i.e., toward upward associations), error rates decreased.  
Response Times. Response times were analyzed via linear mixed effects regression 
with participants and items as crossed random effects, with word class (nouns, verbs) and 
target location (top, bottom) as categorical predictors, with spatial association and visual 
strength as continuous predictors, and with all possible interactions included.9 The main 
effect of spatial association was significant, B = -3.29, t = 2.08, p < .05, such that faster 
responses were elicited by words with an upward spatial association. More importantly, the 
critical interaction of spatial association and target location was significant, B = 15.20, t = 
4.79, p < .001. As in prior studies (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Gozli et al., 2013; 
Verges & Duffy, 2009), words with upward spatial associations elicited slower responses to 
top targets and faster responses to bottom targets. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4. 
For each unit increase in the cue word’s spatial association (i.e., 1 SD, because units are Z-
scores here), visual targets were identified  4 ms more slowly at the top and 14 ms more 
quickly at the bottom. In the extreme, words with spatial associations of -2 (e.g., “fall”) and 
+2 (e.g., “arise”) thus differed by about 50 ms in target identification at the bottom location. 
The 3-way spatial association × target location × visual strength interaction was not 
significant, p = .40, revealing no moderation of the spatial interference effect by visual 
strength. Indeed the identical pattern of results was also observed within both experiments 
separately, with a significant spatial association × target location interaction [Experiment 310: 
                                                 
9 Analyses that included maximal random slopes structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) with 
unrestricted within-participant effect correlations either failed to converge or had non-positive-definite Hessians, 
so we sought to remove redundant terms. The pattern of significant results was the same for all choices of 
random effects structure that we investigated both for models that converged and for the last iteration of models 
that did not converge. We report numerical results from a model without parameters for the correlations among 
the random effects (Barr et al.’s appendix reports these are largely unimportant for alpha and power levels) so as 
to retain all random slopes except that for the visual strength × target location interaction; among all models that 
converged, this model had the most random slopes, which is the critical factor for correct alpha levels. 
10 For the analysis of Experiment 3 only, to achieve convergence, several random slopes with respect to subjects 
were dropped: those that were retained were the target location x spatial association interaction (to ensure that 
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B = 15.47, t = 3.26, p = .001; Experiment 4: B = 14.91, t = 3.65, p < .001] but no moderation 
by visual strength (both p > .34). Thus, spatial interference was obtained within and across 
the two experiments, and in neither case was it moderated by visual strength.  
Visual Strength. Given that visual strength failed to predict target identification times, 
we sought to validate the visual strength ratings by testing whether they predict lexical 
decision times (Connell & Lynott, 2012, in press), which were retrieved from E-Lexicon 
(Balota et al., 2007). We conducted a stepwise regression with lexical control factors of word 
length (number of letters), word frequency (log transformed; Brysbaert & New, 2009), and 
contextual diversity (i.e., the number of contexts in which a word appears; log transformed; 
Adelman, Brown, & Quesada, 2006) in the first step, and then we added visual strength 
ratings in a second step, with lexical decision times (log transformed) as the criterion. The 
initial model with control factors was significant, R2 = .41, F(3, 248) = 56.45, MSE = .01, p < 
.001, with significant effects of length (β = .15, t = 2.82, p < .01) and contextual diversity (β 
= -.92, t = 3.12, p < .01) but not frequency (p = .23), as is typical of word recognition studies 
(e.g., Adelman et al., 2006). More importantly for our purposes, the addition of visual 
strength ratings in the second model explained a significant amount of unique variance 
beyond those control factors, ΔR2 = .01, F(1, 247) = 4.51, β = -.11, p < .05: As in prior 
studies (Connell & Lynott, 2012, in press), strongly visual words elicited faster lexical 
decisions than weakly visual words. Thus, the failure of visual strength to predict target 
identification times was not attributable to an inadequacy of the visual strength ratings.  
Imageability. We also tested whether the more general perceptual factor of 
imageability, rather than visual strength in particular, moderated the spatial interference 
effect. Imageability ratings of the cue words were retrieved from several sources (Bird, 
                                                 
the test of the critical effect did not have inflated alpha level) and the visual strength main effect.  Taking the 
unconverged model fit would lead to the same substantive conclusions as to significance. 
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Franklin, & Howard, 2001; Clark & Paivio, 2004; Cortese & Fugett, 2004; Friendly et al., 
1982; Schock, Cortese, & Khanna, 2012; Toglia & Battig, 1978), each of which used a 1 
(low) to 7 (high) scale. Imageability ratings were available for 250 of the cue words. Nouns 
(range = 2.58-6.44; skew = -.48) and verbs (range = 1.78-6.05; skew = -.22) both exhibited a 
large range of imageability with minimal skew. Moreover, imageability was noncollinear 
with spatial association (tolerance = .94 and VIF = 1.07), thus indicating its appropriateness 
for regression analysis. We therefore replicated the preceding linear mixed effects model, but 
with imageability replacing visual strength; the random slopes had to be excluded for both the 
two-way interactions involving imageability. Only the critical spatial association × target 
location interaction was significant, B = 13.91, t = 3.97, p < .001. No effect or interaction of 
imageability was significant, including the spatial association × target location × imageability 
interaction, p = .50. The spatial association × target location interaction indicating spatial 
interference was also significant within both experiments separately [Experiment 3: B = 
13.78, t = 2.59, p < .01; Experiment 411: B = 14.27, t = 3.37, p < .001], whereas the 3-way 
interaction indicating moderation by imageability did not approach significance within either 
experiment (Experiment 3: p = .77; Experiment 4: p = .31). The spatial interference effect 
thus was not moderated by imageability.  
Testing Alternative Models of Spatial Coding 
The observation of equivalently large spatial interference effects among visually 
strong and visually weak cue words in Experiments 3 and 4 fails to support the competition 
account, which has been the assumed explanation in prior studies of the spatial interference 
effect. Rather, the occurrence of a large spatial interference effect from visually weak cues 
supports instead the perceptual matching account. Below we consider two basic models of 
                                                 
11 For the Experiment 4 only analysis with imageability, from the random-items component, either the intercept 
or the random slope for target location had to be dropped to achieve convergence; the results are numerically 
indistinguishable. 
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spatial coding, which we then test with the data from Experiments 3 and 4. For the remainder 
of this section of the paper, please keep in mind that we are referring to the interference 
paradigm in which the target was never related to the cue word (i.e., all targets were O-). 
A Categorical Model of Spatial Coding 
The typical experimental design, which contrasts cue words with upward (e.g., “star”) 
or downward (e.g., “cellar”) spatial associations (e.g., Bergen et al., 2007; Chasteen, Burdzy, 
& Pratt, 2010; Duschig et al., 2012, 2013; Estes et al., 2008; Goodhew et al., 2014; Gozli et 
al., 2013; Quadflieg et al., 2011; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009; Zhang et al., 
2013), maps clearly onto the perceptual matching account described in the introduction: The 
visual target was described as appearing in either the “matching” location or a “mismatching” 
location. Thus, our theoretical conceptualization treated the congruence between the spatial 
association of the cue and the physical location of the target as a categorical factor. However, 
because our analyses of Experiments 3 and 4 used linear regression, those analyses did not 
provide a direct test of this categorical model of spatial coding. 
If spatial coding were categorical, then we should observe the empirical hallmarks of 
a categorical effect: (1) within-category equivalence, and (2) between-category discontinuity. 
To illustrate, consider five cue words of vertically decreasing spatial associations: “star” = 
6.23, “palace” = 5.05, “tree” = 4.00, “lawn” = 2.82, and “cellar” = 2.27 (where 1 = extremely 
low and 7 = extremely high). If spatial coding were categorical, then extremely and 
moderately upward cues (e.g., “star” and “palace”) should both be coded as matching 
locations for a top target (L+), and thus they should elicit approximately equivalent 
interference effects for unrelated targets (O-), because both would elicit incongruent codes 
(O- L+). Likewise, moderately and extremely downward cues (e.g., “lawn” and “cellar”) 
should both be coded as mismatching locations (L-), and should thus elicit equivalently fast 
responding to unrelated targets (O-) due to their equivalently congruent codes (O- L-). This is 
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within-category equivalence. Moreover, at some point along the spatial association scale, the 
spatial coding must switch from matching to mismatching. This transitional range, which 
presumably includes spatially neutral cues like “tree”, produces a between-category 
discontinuity. Thus, the categorical model of spatial coding predicts a nonlinear step-function 
between spatial associations and response times (see Figure 5A, which is explained more 
fully below).  
A Graded Model of Spatial Coding 
The cue-target spatial relationship can be conceptualized alternatively as a continuum 
that ranges from complete congruence to complete incongruence. In fact, if spatial coding is 
graded in this way, then we may observe differing degrees of interference across the range of 
cue-target spatial congruence, in an approximately linear fashion. This prediction of graded 
interference can be understood in terms of the physical distance between the expected 
location (i.e., based on the cue’s spatial association) and the observed location (i.e., the actual 
target location), with the magnitude of spatial interference being negatively proportional to 
the distance between expected and observed locations. Consider the example of “star”, which 
has an extreme upward association. When an unrelated object appears at the top of the 
display, the object code is fully mismatching but the location code is fully matching, thereby 
producing fully inconsistent codes and hence a full interference effect. But now consider 
“tree”, which has a neutral spatial association. When an unrelated object appears at the top of 
the display, the object code remains fully mismatching but now the location code is only 
semi-matching, so the object and location codes are only semi-consistent and hence the 
interference effect is attenuated. So as the distance between the actual location (e.g., at the 
top of the display) and the expected location gradually increases across intermediate spatial 
cues like “palace”, “tree”, and “lawn”, spatial interference should gradually diminish. And 
finally, with an extremely downward association (e.g., “cellar”), the distance between 
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expected and observed locations is maximal, the object and location codes are fully consistent 
(O- L-), and hence the spatial interference is minimized. Thus, the graded model predicts a 
linear relation between spatial associations and response times. To be clear, this graded 
model of spatial interference is entirely consistent with the theoretical descriptions presented 
in the introduction. The graded model simply fills in the theoretical gap between the extreme 
cases used in standard experimental designs (e.g., Experiments 1 and 2 above). 
Methods 
Using the data from Experiments 3 and 4, we tested whether the spatial interference 
effect is categorical or graded. Our predictor variable was the distance between the expected 
and observed locations of the target object, and the criterion variable was response time. 
Distance scores were computed via the following procedures. First we re-scaled the spatial 
association ratings for the cue words, setting the lowest rating as 0 and the highest rating as 1. 
This value represents the expected location. Then we simply coded the target locations as 0 
for bottom targets and 1 for top targets. This value represents the observed location. Finally 
we calculated the absolute value of the difference between those expected and observed 
locations, so that low values indicate that the target appeared at or near its expected location, 
and high values indicate that the target appeared far from its expected location. Taking the 
absolute value allowed us to collapse across top and bottom targets. For instance, “sky” 
elicited one of the highest spatial association ratings, so its expected location was near 1, at 
.95. When the target appeared at the top location (i.e., observed location = 1), the distance 
between expected and observed locations was minimal (i.e., │.95 - 1│ = .05). And conversely, 
“fail” elicited one of the lowest spatial association ratings (i.e., expected location = .01), so 
when the target appeared at the top location (i.e., observed location = 1), the distance between 
expected and observed locations was large (i.e., │1 - .01│ = .99). 
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The predictions of the categorical and graded models of spatial coding are illustrated 
in Figures 5A and 5B, respectively. If spatial coding is categorical (Figure 5A), then targets 
appearing extremely or moderately near the expected location should elicit equally slow 
responses, and targets appearing extremely or moderately far from the expected location 
should elicit equivalently fast responding. Alternatively, if spatial coding is graded (Figure 
5B), then response times should gradually decrease as the distance between expected and 
observed locations increases.  
To test whether the spatial interference effect was categorical or graded, we compared 
linear and nonlinear models using restricted cubic splines. Restricted cubic splines are an 
alternative to the better-known polynomial regression. Both methods flexibly produce 
nonlinear functions of the predictor by introducing several transformations of that predictor 
into the linear regression (in the polynomial case, these are the original predictor, the square 
of the predictor, the cube of the predictor and so on), each with its own regression coefficient.  
Restricted cubic splines are often preferred to polynomial regression because their fits are 
considered more flexible and more plausible. With restricted cubic splines, the fitted function 
in one part of the predictor range is not strongly influenced by the fitted function in another 
part of the predictor range, as the function can be considered as a series of segments that are 
joined (smoothly) at pre-defined values (known as knots) of the predictor. The two end 
segments are linear, and all interior segments are cubic (hence the name). In contrast, with 
polynomial regression, a small change in the middle of the range can massively change the 
function at the end of the range (and the extrapolation beyond the range), producing visually 
bizarre fits. That is, unlike polynomial regression, restricted cubic splines can produce 
sigmoid functions that flatten at the ends of the range. 
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Restricted cubic splines with 5 knots in distance were fitted (at default locations: 5%, 
27.5%, 50%, 72.5%, 95% quantiles12), with random slopes for the linear effect only13, 
because (a) the model would not converge with random slopes for each component of the 
spline, and (b) this maintained consistency with the linear model, which was fitted with these 
random slopes. Unlike with polynomial regression, the nonlinear components of restricted 
cubic splines are not orthogonal to the linear component nor each other. We thus used model 
comparison to determine whether the nonlinear model fits better than the linear model, to test 
whether the nonlinear block is significant, rather than examining the regression coefficients 
(whose collinearity removes all power). 
Results 
When fitted alone, the linear effect of distance between expected and observed 
locations was significant, B = -25.87, t = -4.11, p < .001. Adding the nonlinear block did not 
significantly improve the fit of the model, χ2(3) = 1.08, p > .7. Thus, the spatial interference 
effect varied approximately linearly with the distance between the expected and observed 
target locations. As shown in Figure 5C, the smaller the distance between expected and 
observed target locations, the larger the magnitude of the spatial interference effect. The 
linearity of this effect suggests that spatial coding is graded rather than categorical. 
Interestingly, the functional form of this relationship appears to flatten out in the 
center of the range of distance scores (Figure 5C), producing a form that is essentially the 
opposite of the categorical model (Figure 5A). This theoretically unexpected flattening may 
arise from an ambiguity of “neutral” spatial association rating, at or near the scale midpoint: 
A mid-scale rating could truly indicate spatial neutrality (i.e., the referent is expected to occur 
at a vertically central location), or it could alternatively indicate spatial unpredictability (i.e., 
                                                 
12 With modified knot placement to permit steeper sigmoid functions (0.05, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.95 values of the 
distance parameter), the qualitative conclusion did not change. 
13 If anything, this should increase our power to detect the nonlinear effect. 
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the referent is expected to occur at various locations on the vertical dimension), or spatial 
irrelevance (i.e., vertical location is not a relevant property of the referent). The present 
research does not distinguish between these different types of neutral spatial associations, but 
they may be related to the slightly flat middle of the function in Figure 5C. However, this 
apparent deviation from linearity did not approach significance, so we refrain from further 
speculation here. Despite this visual observation, the statistical results indicate that the spatial 
interference effect was linear, or graded.  
General Discussion 
Strongly visual and weakly visual nouns and verbs with spatial associations (e.g., 
“bird”, “arise”) hindered identification of simple visual targets (X or O) at their associated 
location (i.e., upper visual field; see Figure 1), thereby replicating the spatial interference 
effect (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Gozli et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2003; 
Verges & Duffy, 2009) and extending it to visually weak words. Spatial associations 
predicted target identification times in an approximately linear manner (see Figures 4 and 
5C), whereas visual strength failed to predict identification times. The failure of visual 
strength to predict target identification times did not appear attributable to an inadequacy in 
the measure itself, and more general imageability ratings similarly failed to predict 
identification times. Below we discuss the empirical contributions of this research and its 
theoretical implications for the simulation and matching accounts of spatial interference.  
Empirical Contributions [REVISE!] 
This research provides several empirical contributions. To begin with, these 
experiments provide three replications of the spatial interference effect, whereby cue words 
hinder rather than facilitate identification of unrelated visual targets at their associated 
location (Estes et al., 2008; Verges & Duffy, 2009), at least under these particular 
experimental conditions (see also Gozli et al., 2013). These replications are important 
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precisely because the effect is counter-intuitive and difficult to reconcile theoretically. These 
experiments also used many more stimuli (N = 256) than prior studies, thereby demonstrating 
the generality of spatial interference. Moreover, the effect occurred with both noun and verb 
cue words (see also Verges & Duffy, 2009), and with both abstract and concrete cue words 
(see also Gozli et al., 2013). This latter contribution is theoretically informative (as described 
below), and contrasts with prior results of Bergen and colleagues (2007), who found spatial 
interference with concrete sentences (e.g., “The mule climbed”) but not with abstract 
sentences (e.g., “The cost climbed”). We cannot say with any certainty why our results differ 
from those of Bergen et al., but it may be due to the fact that their stimuli were varied on 
concreteness, whereas ours were varied on visual strength (in addition to imageability). This 
difference in fact highlights another empirical contribution of this research: Our use of visual 
strength ratings is methodologically superior to the use of imageability or concreteness 
ratings, which are substantially less predictive of language processing (Connell & Lynott, 
2012). Finally, our results provide the first demonstration that the spatial interference effect is 
linear. Whereas all prior studies have simply contrasted words of extremely upward or 
downward spatial associations, our results revealed that the spatial interference effect 
decreases gradually as the physical distance between the expected and observed target 
locations increases.  
Perceptual Simulation. Many researchers have attributed the spatial interference effect 
to location-specific perceptual simulations: The word “bird” shifts attention upward and 
evokes the perceptual representation of a bird, which impairs identification of the visual 
target (e.g., “O”) either by visually masking the target or by preoccupying the neural systems 
necessary for visual perception (Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 
2003; Verges & Duffy, 2009). Indeed, this competition account was plausible because words 
do evoke eye movements toward associated locations (Dudschig et al., 2013; see also 
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Quadflieg et al., 2011; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001; Zhang et al., 
2013) and do activate perceptual representations of the denoted object or event (Barsalou, 
2008; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Martin, 2007; Pecher & Zwaan, 
2005; Pulvermuller & Fadiga, 2010). However, empirical verification of these two 
components of the competition account does not necessarily imply that they cause the spatial 
interference effect, and in fact the present results failed to support this explanation. If spatial 
interference were due to visual simulation, then words with strongly visual representations 
(e.g., “bird”) should elicit greater interference than words with weak or nonvisual 
representations (e.g., “freedom”). But instead, words of strong and weak visual strength and 
high and low imageability elicited equivalent interference. This counter-evidence was 
observed in two experiments with a large number of noun and verb cue words, as well as in 
mixed-effects regression modelling across both experiments combined.  
One possible defence of the competition account is that our ratings of visual strength 
were somehow flawed and hence our independent variable was invalid. This charge is 
unlikely to be correct, because our instructions for the visual strength ratings were based very 
closely on the original instructions of Lynott and Connell (2012). Furthermore, our visual 
strength ratings did significantly predict word recognition times, thereby replicating prior 
studies (Connell & Lynott, 2012, in press). So our measures and variables appear to be 
reliable and valid. Another possible defence of the competition account is that visual strength 
ratings are epiphenomenal and do not actually reflect perceptual simulations. This charge is 
also unlikely to be correct, as perceptual strength ratings do predict actual perceptual 
judgments (Connell & Lynott, 2010; see also van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 
2008) and related perceptual phenomena such as the modality switch effect (Connell & 
Lynott, 2011; Lynott & Connell, 2009; van Dantzig et al., 2011).  
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Yet another defence is that our prediction for the competition account is infelicitous. 
That is, one could argue that the competition account actually predicts equivalent interference 
from strongly visual and nonvisual words. For instance, some researchers have recently 
proposed that abstract concepts are grounded in perceptual experiences of introspection 
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Pecher et al., 2011) or emotion (Kousta et al., 2011). So 
to the extent that those introspective or emotional experiences are visual, abstract concepts 
should elicit spatial interference. However, even if abstract words do have perceptual 
representations, those presumed representations nonetheless vary in visual strength (Connell 
& Lynott, 2012). And words that vary in visual strength should also vary in the magnitude of 
the spatial interference effect. The competition account thus predicts less spatial interference 
from perceptually weak cue words than from perceptually strong cue words, regardless of 
whether one assumes that abstract words have perceptual representations or purely symbolic 
representations. Our cue words ranged from 0.65 to 4.50 on the 0-to-5 visual strength scale, 
so it is not the case that our stimulus set lacked cue words with sufficiently weak visual 
representations. If spatial interference were due to visual simulation, then surely strong visual 
words like “sky” and “jump” should elicit more interference than nonvisual words like 
“heaven” and “flourish”, but they did not. 
Thus, we found no evidence that perceptual simulation explains the spatial 
interference effect. Before considering the perceptual matching explanation, let us be clear 
that these results do not imply a general rejection of perceptual simulation. A great many 
behavioral and neuropsychological studies have conclusively demonstrated the occurrence of 
perceptual simulation during language processing (Barsalou, 2008). Presumably, perceptual 
simulation also occurs in the spatial cueing paradigm; the present results simply indicate that 
such perceptual simulations are not the theoretical culprit causing the spatial interference 
effect. 
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Perceptual Matching. The spatial interference effect is explicable instead by an 
account based on the perceptual match between the cue word and the visual target. This 
account assumes that target objects and locations are both coded for their match with the cue 
word in order to establish whether the target is related to the cue. Critically, consistent object 
and location codes unambiguously indicate whether the target is related to the cue, and 
therefore they elicit fast responding. In contrast, inconsistent codes provide conflicting 
evidence about the target’s relation to the cue, and hence they elicit further processing and 
slowed responding. To illustrate, after hearing or reading “bird”, an unrelated visual target 
(e.g., “O”) elicits inconsistent codes at a top location (O- L+) but consistent codes at a bottom 
location (O- L-). So paradoxically, even though the bottom target is both an unrelated object 
and an unassociated location, the consistency of those negative codes is unambiguous and 
thus facilitates responding. And despite the top target appearing in the associated location, 
this hinders responding because the object and location codes are inconsistent, thereby 
requiring additional processing to disambiguate the target’s relation to the cue.  
This simple account can explain not only the prior demonstrations of spatial 
interference from visually strong cue words, but also our novel demonstration of spatial 
interference from visually weak cue words such as “love”. Because the visual target was 
unrelated to “love”, it elicited inconsistent codes at its associated upper location (O- L+), thus 
delaying the response. This account is also plausible more generally because objects and 
locations are indeed coded independently in perception (Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994), and 
because the consistency between codes does indeed influence cognitive judgments (Lu & 
Proctor, 1995). 
A Graded Model of Spatial Coding and Interference. We also tested whether spatial 
coding is categorical or graded. By a categorical model, each target is coded as either 
spatially “matching” or “mismatching”. As such, only targets appearing in the location 
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associated with the cue (i.e., upward cues with top targets, and downward cues with bottom 
targets) should elicit spatial interference, because only they elicit inconsistent codes (O- L+). 
In contrast, neither spatially neutral nor mismatching cue-target pairs should elicit 
interference, because in both cases the object and location codes are consistent (O- L-). The 
categorical model therefore predicts a quadratic effect, with interference for spatially 
matching trials but equally fast responding on spatially neutral and mismatching trials. 
However, we found no evidence of a quadratic effect, thereby failing to support this simple 
categorical model. Our results instead revealed that the spatial interference effect was linear, 
thereby supporting a graded model of spatial coding. By this model, the cue words’ spatial 
associations fall on a vertical continuum, and so their congruence with the actual target 
location is a matter of degree. Considering the case of a top target, spatial congruence is 
maximal for cues with extremely upward associations (e.g., “star”), it decreases gradually 
across cues with moderately upward (e.g., “palace”), neutral (e.g., “tree”), and moderately 
downward associations (e.g., “lawn”), and finally spatial congruence is minimal for cues with 
extremely downward associations (e.g., “cellar”). The graded model posits that the degree of 
spatial interference is negatively proportional to the physical distance between the expected 
(i.e., associated) and observed (i.e., actual) target locations. Consequently, given a target 
appearing at the top location, identification times should be slowest following cues with 
extremely upward associations, and should decrease gradually across cues with neutral and 
downward spatial associations. The results supported this prediction of a roughly linear 
spatial interference effect.  
To reiterate, our descriptions above and in the introduction – of targets as being 
spatially “matching” or “mismatching” – is a conceptual simplification of our actual results, 
which instead revealed that spatial congruence is a matter of degree. Our terminology of L+ 
and L- only represents the endpoints of this spatial congruence continuum, which also 
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includes moderately congruent and incongruent cues as well as spatially neutral cues. In 
future work we hope to develop a more precise model in which spatial congruence is 
specified on this continuum (e.g., perhaps with -1.0 for complete incongruence, +1.0 for 
complete congruence, and continuously varying intermediate values for cues with moderate 
and neutral spatial associations), so that target response times can be predicted quantitatively.  
Accounting for Spatial Interference and Facilitation. In fact, this graded 
conceptualization of spatial coding suggests that the term “spatial interference effect” may be 
a misnomer, in that the effect of a cue word’s spatial association on identification times may 
be either interference (on congruent trials) or facilitation (on incongruent trials). That is, if we 
consider spatially neutral cue words as a sort of baseline, then spatially congruent trials do 
indeed exhibit interference, but spatially incongruent trials actually exhibit facilitation. The 
linear nature of the effect means that while it is true that congruent cues slow identification, it 
is also true that incongruent cues speed identification, relative to spatially neutral cue words. 
This observation of both interference and facilitation within a single linguistic orienting task 
with identical procedural parameters has not previously been possible, because all prior 
studies have only compared spatially congruent and incongruent trials. By additionally 
including spatially neutral cue words in our analyses, we were able to test for and observe 
both spatial interference and facilitation. And as explained above, this observation critically 
discriminated between two plausible models, thus providing a more clearly specified model 
of spatial effects than prior studies.  
We believe that our matching account may also explain some additional results in the 
literature that otherwise are difficult to integrate theoretically with the spatial interference 
effect: The matching account may explain the task-sensitivity of linguistic orienting effects 
more generally. To our knowledge, all prior demonstrations of spatial interference (Bergen et 
al., 2007; Estes et al., 2008; Gozli et al., 2013; Richardson et al., 2003; Verges & Duffy, 
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2009) required participants to identify a target stimulus. In contrast, a few recent studies have 
used a detection task instead, whereby participants simply pressed a button as soon as they 
detected the presence of a visual target (regardless of its identity). Interestingly, those studies 
found that spatial cue words facilitated target detection at their associated location (Chasteen 
et al., 2010; Duschig et al., 2012; Gozli et al., 2013). The matching account may also explain 
this facilitated target detection, in that the detection task does not require an object code 
because the target’s identity is not relevant to responding. Suppose “bird” is followed by a 
square target at the top of the display in a detection task. The target appears in the congruent 
location, and because the task does not entail object coding, the congruent location code 
simply produces facilitation. In other words, because the target location is coded but the 
target object is not coded, inconsistent codes do not arise and hence the congruent location 
code facilitates responding. This explanation assumes, however, that object and location 
codes are activated in a task-sensitive manner; object and location coding are assumed to 
occur primarily in tasks for which the identity of the object and its location are relevant, but 
not in tasks for which they are irrelevant. Accumulating evidence supports this assumption 
(for review see Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). To be sure, the pattern of 
spatial interference and facilitation effects in the identification and detection tasks is complex 
(see Gozli et al., 2013), but a perceptual matching account provides a promising direction for 
further theoretical development. 
COMMENT ON SMALLER EFFECT OF LOC THAN OF OBJ… 
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Table 1. Spatial association scores and visual strength ratings of cue words in Experiments 3 
and 4. 
Word Class Factor Min Max M SD Skew
Nouns Spatial Association -1.76 2.39 0.00 1.00 0.35
(Expt. 3) Visual Strength 0.65 4.50 2.75 1.33 -0.15
Verbs Spatial Association -2.02 2.01 0.00 1.00 -0.05
(Expt. 4) Visual Strength 0.67 4.50 2.19 0.75 0.24  
Note. Spatial Association values are Z-scores, with higher numbers indicating upward 
associations. Visual Strength values are ratings on a scale from 0 to 5, with higher numbers 
indicating greater visual strength. 
 
Language and Spatial Attention     54 
 
Figure 1. Trial procedure of Experiments 1 and 2, illustrating a trial with an upward cue 
followed by a related object at the top target location. In terms of object (O) and location (L) 
coding, this represents an O+ L+ trial. 
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Figure 2. Response times (M ± SE) to semantically unrelated or related target objects 
presented at the top or bottom of a display following cue words with upward or downward 
associations, Experiment 1. Object (O) and location (L) codes are provided at the base of 
each bar. 
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Figure 3. Response times (M ± SE) to semantically related target objects presented at the top 
or bottom of a display following cue words with upward or downward associations, 
Experiment 2. Object (O) and location (L) codes are provided at the base of each bar. 
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Figure 4. Mean response times to visual targets presented at the top or bottom of the display 
as a function of the cue word’s spatial association, Experiments 3 and 4. Higher and lower 
spatial association values indicate upward and downward associations, respectively. In terms 
of object (O) and location (L) coding, upward cues with top targets (i.e., right side of dashed 
line) and downward cues with bottom targets (i.e., left side of solid line) represent O- L+ 
trials, whereas upward cues with bottom targets (i.e., right side of solid line) and downward 
cues with top targets (i.e., left side of dashed line) represent O- L- trials. 
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Figure 5. Predictions of a categorical model (Panel A) and a graded model of spatial coding (Panel B), and actual results from Experiments 3 
and 4 (Panel C). In terms of object (O) and location (L) coding, the left end of the X-axis represents O- L+ trials, and the right end represents O- 
L- trials. 
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Appendix A. Results of the Spatial Rating Pre-Test of Experiment 2. Cues selected for use in 
the experiment are identified in the “Cue Category” column.   
Spatial % Cue Spatial % Cue
Cue Association Nowhere Category Cue Association Nowhere Category
alligator 1.48 6 Downward kite 4.23 6 Upward
anchor 1.34 14 Downward knee 2.13 3
angel 4.64 47 ladder 3.46 16
ant 1.22 7 Downward lake 1.67 3
antenna 3.79 16 Upward lamp 2.74 18
arrow 3.20 46 lawn 1.37 2
asteroid 4.78 7 lightbulb 3.73 20
attic 3.97 2 lightning 4.56 4 Upward
badge 2.81 12 loft 3.72 5
banana 2.80 56 mask 3.08 11
basement 1.33 5 mat 1.34 5
beach 1.80 6 meteor 4.90 4
beanstalk 3.11 12 mirror 2.94 12
beaver 1.64 9 Downward missile 4.65 18
bed 2.26 1 moat 1.54 7
beetle 1.31 14 Downward mole 1.42 10
bell 3.31 42 moon 4.90 2 Upward
belt 2.41 9 mountain 4.39 5 Upward
bike 2.31 5 mouse 1.24 8 Downward
bird 4.11 15 Upward mustache 2.99 4
blimp 4.75 4 Upward necklace 3.02 6
book 2.68 41 nest 3.93 11 Upward
bowtie 2.98 7 ocean 1.70 4
branch 3.84 15 Upward parachute 4.44 16 Upward
bridge 3.14 10 parrot 3.32 28
bullet 2.76 54 patio 2.18 7
cabinet 3.14 9 phone 2.68 29
candle 2.58 34 pier 2.27 5
car 2.60 2 pig 1.79 3
carpet 1.31 2 plane 4.70 7 Upward
carrot 1.58 35 planet 4.91 11 Upward
casket 1.83 12 pool 1.59 4 Downward
cat 1.67 18 porch 2.21 5
cave 2.50 16 poster 3.15 13
ceiling 3.97 2 potato 1.73 37
cellar 1.38 4 puddle 1.33 3 Downward
cemetery 1.71 7 rainbow 4.58 4 Upward
chair 2.36 3 river 1.57 3
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Appendix A, continued. 
Spatial % Cue Spatial % Cue
Cue Association Nowhere Category Cue Association Nowhere Category
chandelier 3.98 2 Upward road 1.55 2 Downward
chicken 1.56 11 Downward rock 1.40 18
chimney 3.97 4 Upward roof 4.09 1 Upward
chin 2.93 4 sandals 1.36 5 Downward
cigarette 2.88 31 satellite 4.79 5 Upward
clock 3.37 21 scarf 3.00 12
cloud 4.76 1 Upward sea 1.68 6
collar 2.87 7 sewer 1.20 2
comet 4.88 4 Upward sheep 2.02 2
crown 3.34 8 shirt 2.83 10
crypt 1.69 10 shoes 1.40 3 Downward
cuckoo 3.25 29 sink 2.38 4
cup 2.64 34 skateboard 1.48 5 Downward
curtains 3.21 5 skates 1.41 9 Downward
dart 2.92 34 skis 1.62 13 Downward
desk 2.40 0 skylight 4.09 1
devil 1.64 53 skyscraper 4.61 2 Upward
dirt 1.23 6 sled 1.64 9 Downward
door 3.01 4 slippers 1.35 6 Downward
duck 1.74 18 slug 1.22 8 Downward
dungeon 1.41 12 snail 1.16 4 Downward
ear 3.06 3 socks 1.45 6 Downward
elbow 2.62 7 sofa 2.24 3
elephant 3.47 7 star 4.94 2 Upward
eye 3.03 3 steeple 3.96 4 Upward
feet 1.31 2 Downward stork 3.64 14 Upward
fireworks 4.62 3 Upward sun 4.77 2 Upward
fish 1.32 12 Downward surfboard 1.81 23
flag 3.97 7 Upward table 2.43 0
flower 1.54 13 Downward telescope 2.91 14
flute 2.86 35 television 2.91 7
fork 2.45 38 tiara 3.22 6
frisbee 3.35 32 toes 1.36 3
frog 1.32 10 Downward toilet 1.98 2
giraffe 3.84 4 Upward tooth 2.99 7
glasses 3.07 11 tornado 4.04 17
gopher 1.25 5 Downward towel 2.70 37
grass 1.28 3 Downward tower 4.36 2 Upward
grave 1.29 3 trail 1.59 5
grill 2.46 5 train 2.96 5
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Appendix A, continued. 
Spatial % Cue Spatial % Cue
Cue Association Nowhere Category Cue Association Nowhere Category
guitar 2.59 20 tree 3.67 5 Upward
gun 2.64 41 trousers 2.19 9
halo 3.52 15 turban 3.23 10
harbor 2.07 10 vase 2.59 21
hat 3.29 9 volleyball 3.06 48
head 3.09 1 weeds 1.45 4 Downward
helicopter 4.62 2 Upward well 1.53 3 Downward
helmet 3.16 8 whale 1.67 9 Downward
horse 3.02 3 wheel 1.76 7
house 3.15 2 wig 3.18 10
hurricane 3.91 31 window 3.01 13
jacket 2.87 17 worm 1.13 4 Downward   
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Appendix B. Cue words used in Experiment 3 (nouns).  
Spatial Visual Spatial Visual
Cue Association Strength Cue Association Strength
ability 0.92 1.23 library 0.23 4.27
advice 1.19 1.12 lobster -0.76 4.33
agility 0.39 1.58 love 2.03 2.21
anger -0.40 2.10 mastery 1.08 0.94
ankle -1.40 3.87 menace -0.76 1.62
anxiety -0.24 1.27 mercy 0.72 1.06
arrow -0.84 4.12 method 0.31 1.00
banner 0.31 4.13 mind 1.11 0.81
barrel -0.80 3.85 month 0.04 0.94
belief 1.44 0.85 mood 0.48 1.44
bird 0.75 4.40 moral 1.08 0.88
bottle -0.80 4.13 moss -1.60 3.94
bowl -0.84 3.98 mule -0.72 3.98
brute -0.60 1.62 oats -1.16 3.65
bullet -1.04 3.85 opinion 0.95 0.69
candy -0.68 3.88 palace 0.92 4.08
cattle -0.49 4.27 panic -0.05 2.12
cellar -1.52 3.88 passion 1.39 1.63
chance 0.43 0.65 pepper -0.60 3.63
charm 0.72 1.83 piano -0.29 4.04
coin -1.16 4.19 pleasure 1.39 1.79
comedy 1.19 2.12 pole -0.16 3.98
cord -1.56 3.94 power 1.59 1.52
cost 0.07 1.79 prayer 1.36 1.42
crisis 0.12 1.77 prestige 0.75 1.23
death -0.60 2.23 pride 1.44 1.44
demon -1.68 1.94 quest 0.75 1.27
drama -0.16 1.62 sadness -0.93 1.60
dream 1.51 2.42 safety 1.63 1.42
duty 0.87 1.04 salad -0.68 3.90
effort 1.31 1.50 satire 0.00 1.02
ego 0.56 0.77 sauce -1.08 3.50
flag 0.59 4.27 series 0.12 1.27
flood -0.93 3.83 shadow -0.72 3.79
flower -0.06 4.50 shock 0.28 1.83
forest 0.39 4.33 shoes -1.32 4.17
fork -1.12 4.08 skull -0.57 3.94
fur -0.60 3.60 sky 2.15 4.33
galaxy 2.31 3.65 slipper -1.16 4.00
geese -0.29 4.42 slush -1.32 2.88  
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Appendix B, continued. 
Spatial Visual Spatial Visual
Cue Association Strength Cue Association Strength
gem 0.12 3.85 snake -1.37 4.31
glacier 0.20 3.88 spirit 1.47 1.19
gold 0.28 3.87 spree -0.44 1.29
gravity -0.21 1.17 star 1.95 4.27
greed -0.24 1.54 string -0.80 3.90
green -0.49 3.87 sugar -0.44 3.40
grief -0.65 1.73 sunset 1.44 4.40
hatred -0.93 1.33 theory 0.56 0.85
heaven 2.39 1.54 ticket -0.57 4.02
hoof -1.60 3.46 time 0.67 1.35
hour 0.07 0.79 toast -0.80 3.77
humor 1.31 1.58 tomb -1.40 3.75
insect -1.64 4.27 tool -0.68 3.81
interest 0.92 1.31 tower 0.22 4.12
irony -0.05 0.85 toy -0.60 3.88
jail -1.76 3.65 tragedy -0.68 2.17
jelly -0.88 3.83 tree 0.00 4.44
joy 1.23 2.31 tripod -0.93 3.92
justice 1.59 1.29 trouble -0.68 1.37
keg -0.80 3.88 truck -0.16 4.38
kettle -0.60 3.98 trumpet -0.29 3.63
lawn -1.04 4.19 truth 1.71 1.17
lecture -0.13 2.54 vigor 0.48 1.17
lemon -0.72 3.98 whale -0.16 4.27  
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Appendix C. Cue words used in Experiment 4 (verbs). 
Spatial Visual Spatial Visual
Cue Association Strength Cue Association Strength
acquire 0.16 1.73 hop 1.15 3.19
adopt 0.08 1.35 hope 1.17 1.17
alarm 0.17 2.25 impact -0.23 1.90
alienate -0.35 0.92 increase 1.28 1.67
arise 2.01 1.90 inspire 0.76 1.31
arrive -0.05 1.88 jog 0.28 3.10
ascend 1.70 2.06 jump 1.28 3.40
block 0.10 3.08 lapse -1.23 0.67
boost 1.65 1.67 leap 1.46 3.13
bounce -0.14 2.98 lend -0.21 1.35
bring -0.10 1.73 lift 1.30 2.46
carry 0.65 2.40 linger 0.04 1.19
chase 0.21 2.96 lower -1.19 1.77
clamber 1.22 1.58 march 0.13 3.04
climb 1.69 3.02 perch 0.49 2.50
collect 0.05 1.65 pity -0.85 1.27
commend 0.26 1.19 plummet -1.97 2.19
confiscate 0.09 1.73 plunge -1.96 2.48
corrode -1.17 2.06 prevail 0.70 1.06
cough -0.06 2.63 provoke -0.11 1.08
crave 0.36 1.06 punish -0.98 1.40
crawl 0.05 3.02 push -0.06 2.58
cross -0.03 3.38 raise 1.58 1.90
crush -1.19 2.19 receive -0.04 1.50
cry -1.34 2.73 regret -0.16 0.90
decay -1.72 2.40 rejoice 1.71 1.75
decline -1.46 1.38 report -0.22 2.12
decrease -1.49 1.29 retrieve -0.22 1.71
demolish -1.07 2.81 roam 0.11 2.02
depart 0.08 2.13 rob -0.18 2.31
depress -1.11 1.21 roll -0.34 2.62
descend -1.54 1.96 run 0.04 2.96
dig -1.10 2.92 rush 0.02 2.17
dive -1.93 2.90 sadden -0.79 1.60
drain -0.92 2.85 send -0.01 1.54
dribble -0.72 2.79 sink -1.64 3.23
drip -1.25 2.92 skip 0.69 2.63
drop -1.70 2.42 slide -0.25 2.83
elate 0.92 1.44 slump -1.87 2.42
emerge 1.44 1.94 smash -0.74 2.77  
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Appendix C, continued. 
Spatial Visual Spatial Visual
Cue Association Strength Cue Association Strength
endure 0.00 1.35 snatch 0.10 2.00
erode -1.02 2.48 sneeze 0.05 3.00
escalate 1.65 1.42 soar 1.79 2.63
escape 0.23 1.60 spring 1.29 2.85
exist 0.29 1.27 sprout 1.47 2.98
expel -0.29 1.38 stagger -0.23 2.83
fail -1.98 1.21 stop -0.14 1.75
fall -2.02 2.85 swap -0.14 1.81
flee -0.01 2.44 sweep -0.24 3.13
float 1.18 2.67 tempt 0.15 1.10
flourish 1.57 1.67 thank 0.06 1.62
flower 0.96 4.50 think 0.57 1.06
fly 1.37 3.21 thrive 1.49 1.15
follow 0.07 2.31 tow 0.12 2.73
frown -1.03 3.60 tower 1.85 4.12
gallop 0.27 2.94 transfer -0.09 1.56
glide 0.06 2.44 tremble -0.38 2.44
grow 1.74 2.42 tumble -1.84 2.94
guide 0.12 1.88 wade -0.21 2.58
hang -0.48 2.63 wait -0.23 1.19
haul 0.29 2.31 walk 0.01 3.58
heighten 1.15 1.29 wash -0.62 2.90
hoist 0.90 2.17 wither -1.35 2.23
hold 0.35 1.88 yank -0.33 2.25  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Instructions used in Experiments 1 and 2.  
“Thank you for participating in this experiment, which examines the interaction between 
language and object recognition. The experiment takes about 5-10 minutes [Experiment 2: 
15-20 minutes] to complete. 
 
On each trial of the experiment, you will first see a cross (+) in the middle of the screen. The 
cross appears only very briefly -- you should focus your attention on the cross. Then, after the 
cross disappears, a word will appear in the center of the screen. Please pay attention to the 
word. It will also disappear very quickly. Finally, a black-and-white image will appear at 
either the top or the bottom of the screen. On some trials, the image will be a real object, like 
a drawing of an apple. But on other trials, the image will NOT be a real object, like just some 
lines or shapes. Your task is simply to indicate, as quickly as possible, whether the image is a 
real object or not. If it IS a real object, press 'M' with your right index finger. If it is NOT a 
real object, press 'X' with your left index finger. The computer will be timing your responses, 
so please respond as quickly as you can without making errors.  
 
Also, on some trials the image will be a real object (e.g., a ball), but the object is not the same 
as the word (e.g. "apple"). In that case, the correct response is still 'M', because a ball is a real 
object. [This paragraph did not appear in Experiment 2.] 
 
Press 'B' to begin the practice trials.” 
…. 
 
[After the practice trials and prior to the experimental trials, the following reminder 
appeared.] 
 
“Just remember: Press 'M' if it is a real object, or press 'X' if it is not a real object. The 
computer will be timing your responses, so please respond as quickly as you can without 
making errors. 
 
When you're ready to begin, press 'B'.” 
 
 
Instructions used on Mechanical Turk in Experiment 2.  
[The following general instructions were posted on Mechanical Turk for respondents to read 
prior to accepting the task.] 
 
Experiment on Visual Perception 
 
We are conducting an academic experiment on the interaction between language and 
visual perception. The experiment takes about 15-20 minutes. 
 
Warning: This experiment requires intense concentration. 
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1. This HIT cannot be completed on a mobile device; it can only be completed on a 
desktop or laptop computer with a keyboard. 
 
2. This HIT requires your serious concentration. Please do not accept this HIT unless you 
are willing and able to devote your full attention to the task, and please complete this HIT 
in a quiet environment with no other distractions. 
 
3. Once you begin this HIT, please complete the entire HIT in one sitting. Please do not 
take a break and return to it later. This HIT consists of 240 trials, with each trial lasting 
only a few seconds. Please do not accept this HIT unless you are prepared to complete all 
240 trials (approximately 18 minutes). 
 
4. This HIT will be completed on an external website that will record your response 
times. In the experiment, you will be asked to judge -- as quickly as possible without 
making errors -- whether some visual images are real objects or not. Your task will be to 
make these object / non-object judgments as fast as possible, and your response times will 
be recorded. The timing will be sensitive to fractions of a second. Thus, please note that 
the experiment may take a brief moment to begin, as all the visual images will be 
uploaded at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
[The specific instructions shown below were then presented on an external website where 
respondents completed the task.] 
 
 
Instructions used in the Spatial Rating Pre-Test of Experiment 2. 
“Some things regularly appear high or low in the visual field, that is, on the vertical axis. For 
example, a hawk is usually high in your visual field, a face is usually near the center of your 
visual field (i.e., not particularly high or low), and a dog is usually low. However, some other 
things don't have a strong association with any particular area of vertical space. For instance, 
you might often see an apple up high in a tree, centrally on a table, or down low on the 
ground. 
 
Below we will ask you to indicate, for 180 objects, where you would expect to see them on 
the vertical axis. If the object has no particular spatial association (e.g., an apple), then you 
should choose "Nowhere in Particular".  But if it is more often seen in a particular location, 
then rate whether you expect to see it low, centrally, or high on the vertical axis.  
 
This is a serious study. Please take your task seriously, and please pay careful attention. Also, 
we value your opinion, so please answer as truthfully as you can.” 
 
  
 
